#coal peaker plants for #energy in #China
on 02025-12-03#China commissioned 30.5GW of #coal power plants in 02024, permitted 66.7GW, and started construction on 94.5GW. #energy
on 02025-12-03#China #coal #climate-change #energy
on 02024-11-28#China is switching from limiting #energy usage to limiting CO₂ emissions to mitigate #climate-change, as of August 2. “The output of the cement and steel industries has also been declining due to the slump in the real estate sector, suggesting that China’s CO2 emissions may have peaked in the first quarter of this year and showed a downward trend in the second quarter. However, the current trend is not sufficient to achieve the 18% target, and China needs to accelerate the development of clean energy while reducing the use of fossil fuels in the power sector and other industries.” The cement industry thing might explain why China can be importing more #coal than ever but emitting less CO₂.
on 02024-11-28latest #CREA #PDF slides on #China: “China #energy and emissions trends: November 2024 snapshot”. Astonishing: “Total power generation increased by 6.6%, while large-scale power generation grew by 2.1%, indicating most power generation growth comes from #solar and #wind installations that are outside of the industrial production statistics. (...) National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) underreports wind and solar generation, particularly from rooftop and smaller solar plants.” I think those figures are year-over-year rather than month-over-month because, on the same slide, they say, “solar power generation saw an increase of 46.2%.” Carbon emissions are said to have peaked in February 02024 despite #coal electric power generation growing 2.2% (in what I assume is year over year). Astoundingly: “After H1 2024 saw no new permits issued for coal-based steel plants, China issued a policy in August suspending all new #steel plant permits.” (Are they going to import their steel from India, or what?)
on 02024-11-27#PDF slides from #CREA (the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, which seems like it ought to be “CRECA”), entitled “#China #energy and emissions trends: August 2024 snapshot”, showing a rise in #coal imports to an all-time high of 500 million tonnes per year! And a rise in total coal use to about 5100 million tonnes per year (at ≈25MJ/kg, that’s 4TW), plus 780 million tonnes a year of crude #oil (1.0TW) and 410 billion cubic meters of gas per year (490GW at 37.8kJ/ℓ), for a fossil total of 5.5TW. There’s a plot of “oil products” but I’m not sure counting that wouldn’t be double-counting. Also plots by-month #solar energy production by month going back to 02018, showing an all-time high of 40 TWh in June 02024 (55GW), which is a pretty low capacity factor given the November stat of 790GW installed from the NEA reports. If we project 790GW backward at a 3.3% monthly growth rate from November to June, 5 months, we predict 672GW installed as of June, of which 55GW would be only an 8% capacity factor. And that’s in the peak month! Not even year-round! So the 54GW they added of fossil-fuel power over the last 12 months is probably still more than the 256GW of solar after adjusting for capacity factors. The slide on p. 7 showing a bargraph of solar capacity added in the first half of each year since 02010 is pretty staggering. It seems to show that the high #pricing for #photovoltaic modules in the 02018-02022 period suppressed demand rather badly in China itself, not just abroad, though that pricing isn’t mentioned.
on 02024-11-27